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FOREWORD
It has long been an unanswered question just how accurately
reported opinions reflect the actual application of legal princi-
ples in the trial courts. Nowhere is this more true than in the
field of labor injunctions.
In Ohio, for instance, there have been, in all courts, only 45
reported decisions involving labor injunctions in the entire his-
tory of Ohio law. Since the first relief of this sort was in 18871
this means over a period of fifty-two years. During all this
time only one case has ever reached the Ohio Supreme Court on
its merits." Certainly no one believes that this remotely repre-
sents the full extent of judicial material on this subject.
* Seniors in the College of Law, the Ohio State University. The material
for Cleveland was gathered and tabulated and put into textual form by Louis
Berwitt; that for Columbus by John Harmon, assisted in the preliminary
stagew by Craig Stockdale; that for Dayton by Leon Stone; that for Toledo by
Jerome Brooks; and that for Youngstown by Franklyn W. Bair. Raymond A.
Mahoney assisted in the making of interviews in Columbus. The foreword,
conclusion and preparation of the chart in Appendix 3 was prepared by
Robert E. Mathews, Professor of Law, under whose general supervision this
survey was conducted.
1 New York etc., R. R. Co. v. Wenger, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 815, 17 Bull.
3o6 (Cuyahoga Common Pleas, 1887).
" La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. v. International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, et al., io8 Ohio St. 61, 14o N.E. 899 (1923).
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By way of support for this suspicion it should be observed
that many authorities believe that the issuance of a restraining
order or injunction in a labor controversy has a practical effect
on the behavior of the parties that is out of all proportion to the
theoretical nature of the restraint. In the abstract, an injunction
contemplates the preservation of the status quo; in practice it
is often its destruction. This is due to the fact that to an excep-
tional degree human behavior is being regulated for the preser-
vation of property values. The employee defendants-and
ordinarily it is employees who are defendants-have staked the
success of their position as bargainers in a controversy upon their
capacity to organize their pressure tactics. The livelihood of
hundreds is in issue. High morale is an essential to the main-
tenance of position. The advent of a court order has, accord-
ingly, a psychological effect incapable of appreciation from the
viewpoint of abstract legalism. The class of men and women
involved, their educational and racial backgrounds, their point
of view towards the courts, toward government, toward indus-
try, and the intensity of the emotional strain under which they
are living at the moment, all these contribute to this effect.
Thus a court order, whether or not in accord with the accepted
views of other Ohio courts, and whether or not susceptible to
reversal on appeal, often produces a finality of effect upon the
conduct of employee groups that belies the theoretical tenta-
tiveness of the restraint."
If, accordingly, it can be truly said that labor injunctions
stand in a class apart in this respect, then it will not be surpris-
ing to find that in practice few cases are ever prosecuted to final
judgment, much less ever taken up to higher courts. The issue,
practically speaking, will already have been determined upon
the issuance of the restraining order or temporary injunction.
With these thoughts in mind, the five students who are co-
3 The Classic discussion of this point is found in Frankfurter and Greene,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) p. 200, et seq.
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authors of this article, of their own initiative undertook during
the summer of 1938 to examine the records in five Ohio coun-
ties, in an attempt to determine the actual practices involved in
the issuance of these restraints in labor controversies. The
counties were selected upon the basis of personal convenience
rather than local characteristics. This fact, inevitable in the
problem, has prevented a broader balance of sampling from
different Ohio communities. The areas examined were Cleve-
land (Cuyahoga County), Columbus (Franklin County), Day-
ton (Montgomery County), Toledo (Lucas County), and
Youngstown (Mahoning County). For convenience in designa-
tion these areas will be referred to by their chief cities.
In order to set the practical limits to the period covered,
the survey was limited to proceedings filed or decided within
the five year period, July I, 1933 to June 30, 1938.
At the start, it was extremely difficult to agree upon the in-
formation to be obtained and to set up a uniform device for
gathering and tabulating it. Having no other such survey at
hand the process was inevitably a succession of improvisations
based on trial and error. At length a form questionnaire was
evolved upon which the examiners gathered their data. It soon
became apparent that in many regards this form was in turn
inadequate and, while it was necessarily continued in use, the
final summation, arrangement and breakdown of material is
substantially different from the original outline. Had the sur-
vey commenced at the point where it ultimately ceased the in-
formation would have been both more accurate and more easily
obtained.
The sources of information were of two types: court rec-
ords and conversations. Probably the appearance dockets
contributed the most fruitful source of the first sort. The con-
versations served to fill in interstices and to provide color and
understanding. Personal contacts were made in each city
through the courtesy of three organizations: the Junior Cham-
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ber of Commerce, the Ohio State Federation of Labor and the
Ohio Industrial Union Council.
The balance of this article will be a discussion, therefore, of
each of the five areas separately, followed by a comment on the
group as a whole and a statistical chart analysis, area by area and
by totals.
The arrangement of subject matter will follow the same
general outline throughout. It will open with an introductory
section showing that during the five year period there have been
a total of 55 cases in which relief of some sort was granted. It
is interesting to note that during this same time and in the
same counties there were only eight instances of reported deci-
sions on the same subject matter.5 Thus about seven times as
many restraining orders and injunctions were issued as will be
found in the printed reports.
By far the larger portion of the material is concerned with
the detailed analysis of these 55 cases in which some variety of
restraint was granted. This is first classified by parties, plain-
tiff employers (51 cases), plaintiff employees against employ-
ers (2 cases) and inter-employee disputes (2 cases). Next fol-
lows an analysis of use and amount of bonds and then a detailed
study of the relationship between the parties. This is material
4 Without the aid of these groups the work of investigation would have
been seriously hampered. The authors jointly wish to express their apprecia-
tion to the following: Mr. Fred J. Milligan, former President of the Colum-
bus Junior Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Thomas J. Donnelly, Secretary-
Treasurer of the Ohio State Federation of Labor; and Mr. Ted F. Silvey,
Secretary-TreaSurer of the Ohio Industrial Union Council, C.I.O. Each of
these persons wrote letters of introduction to individuals in the five cities in
which the survey was being conducted. Gratitude is also expressed to the
following for valuable assistance in conversation or through correspondence:
the Honorable Joy Seth Hurd, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County, and to Messrs. Lowell Goerlich and Brandon Schnorf,
Toledo attorneys; Mr. Otto Brach, Regional Claims Board, Toledo; Mr.
Albert H. Scharrer, Dayton attorney; Mr. John C. Getreu, President Colum-
bus Federation of Labor; Mr. Paul Herbert, now Lieutenant-Governor of
Ohio; Mr. T. J. Duffy, Mr. Robert D. Touvelle, and Mr. Webb Vorys,
Columbus attorneys; Mr. John Mayo, Sub-Regional Director, C.I.O., Youngs-
town; Mr. A. A. McCarthy, Springfield, attorney.
' See cases listed in Appendix, No. 2.
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in order to determine whether a technical trade dispute exists
in the light of the accepted restricted Ohio definition-namely
that a trade dispute is a dispute as to hours, wages, conditions
of work or recognition between an employer and his immediate
employees. ' Deducting the two inter-employee cases, it will be
noted that the remaining 53 are almost evenly devided, 26
being instances of trade disputes and 27 not. (See chart analysis,
in Appendix 3, item 13).
The major portion of the balance of the analysis is devoted
to the types of behavior enjoined. The reported decisions of
Ohio cases have traditionally shown a willingness to permit be-
havior in the presence of a trade dispute which they enjoin in
its absence. Hence the survey proceeds to analyze in some de-
tail just what the courts have been enjoining in this state in
each of these two situations (Chart Analysis, Appendix 3, Item
17). The study concluded with an examination of the ultimate
disposition of the 55 cases in which restraint of some sort has
been granted. The five areas will now be considered separately
and in alphabetical sequence of chief cities.
CLEVELAND
In the Cleveland area within the period covered by this sur-
vey-July I, 1933 to June 30, 1938-thirty-eight cases were
found in which some variety of injunction or restraining order
was granted against a labor group or groups. Among these were
twenty-eight temporary injunctions, or "temporary restraining
orders," as the docket entry usually refers to them,' and twelve
" For discussion of Ohio definitions of the term "trade dispute" see com-
ments in 5 O.S.L.J. 236 (i939); 4 id. io (i937); io Ohio Bar 703
(Mar. 21, 1938).7 Ca.es Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, IX, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, ?2, 23, 24,
25, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38. Cases in these and following
notes are cited by the numerical order in which they are listed in the appendix.
Name, of the parties and docket numbers will be found there. All those cited
in notes 7 to I I I inclusive are in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga
County. Because of the vast quantity of material accumulated in the files of
the Clerk's office in that county, it was only possible to examine the cases of
employer plaintiffs. Hence employee-plaintiff cases are omitted; they appear,
however, in the records of the other four counties.
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permanent injunctions.8 In six of the latter there was issued
first a temporary restraining order and subsequently a per-
manent injunction.' In no case was an injunction granted to a
defendant.
There appears to be prevalent a belief among many Cleve-
land lawyers that a rule of court exists to the effect that an in-
junction or restraining order will not be issued without notice
to the defendants and opportunity for a hearing. There is in
fact no such rule, but several years ago a practice to this effect
was adopted by one of the Cleveland judges.1" This has been
extensively followed by other members of the Common Pleas
Court of Cuyahoga County. Despite this practice, however, it
appears that since April, 1934, there have been five instances of
ex parte restraint.11
The injunction itself is rarely written by the judge. In cases
where a hearing is contemplated the plaintiff's attorney usually
prepares it and it is then submitted to the defendant's attorney
for approval. If no agreement as to its form or substance can
be reached with opposing counsel, the injunction is then sub-
8 Cases Nos. 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, i8, 20, 25, z8, 29, 30, and 36.
9 Cases Nos. 2, 9, 25, z8, z9, and 36.
10 "The judges of this court have not adopted any rule of court in regard
to procedure to be used in injunctions involving labor disputes, . . . but,
briefly, I have adopted the policy of not granting any injunction upon final
hearing unless and until proper service has been made upon all interested
parties and a definite date set for the hearing, and then only after a full trial
in which all parties have had an opportunity to present their respective con-
tentions. While I have, in certain cases, permitted the reading of affidavits
upon preliminary hearing for a temporary order, I have done so only with
the express direction that no affidavit shall be read unless the party making the
affidavit shall be subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel if desired."
(Letter from Judge Joy Seth Hurd, January 28, 1939).
11 In two of these five cases the source of information for the statement
that an injunction was issued without notice or a hearing was from the attor-
ney who represented the plaintiff in each case. (Cases Nos. 26 and 27). In
two of the five cases the source of information was the attorney who repre-
sented the defendants (Cases Nos. i and 16). The source of information
for the fifth case is the brief which was filed by defendant's attorney. In this
brief the defendant contends that a petition and application for a temporary
injunction was presented to the court without notice having been served upon
the defendants. (Case No. 33).
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mitted to the judge and he rules upon the conditions, phrasing,
or scope of the injunction, or makes such corrections and amend-
ments as he sees fit.
The Ohio statutes require a bond upon the issuance of an
injunction, whether the issuance be ex parte or upon a hearing."
In two of the five ex parte cases the bond was set at $5oo In
the other three a $Iooo bond was set in one,' a $I5oo bond was
set in another," and in the last no bond appears to have been
required." The average, where required, was accordingly $875-
In the twelve cases in which permanent injunctions were
granted, no bond was required other than an appeal bond.
In the case of the issuance of a temporary injunction the fol-
lowing information was gotten from the docket entries: in eight
cases, the bond was set at $ioo; ' in two cases, at $2oo18 in
one case, at $300;" in twelve cases, at $500;2 in one case, at
$1000; 22 and in four cases, no bond required.22 Thus, the aver-
age amount of the bond in the twenty-four cases, where any
was required, was $354; the median, $5oo.
It is interesting to note that, in only seven cases out of
thirty-eight, the court made a specific finding as to the existence
or non-existence of a trade dispute. In three there was an ex-
press holding that a trade dispute existed, 2 and that in four
there was "no legitimate trade dispute."24 In the remaining
thirty-one cases the journal entry made no mention of the ex-
istence or non-existence of a trade dispute. This was true even
in those cases where the plaintiff's petition averred that no trade
12 Ohio General Code, sees. ii,88z, 11,885, and II, 889.
I" Cases Nos. z6 and 33.
14 Case No. i.
", Case No. 27.
13 Case No. 16.
17 Cases Nos 2, 12, 13, 15, 21, 23, 28, and 36.
"8 Cases Nos. 5 and 37.
"9 Case No. 34.
2' Cases Nos. 6, 7, II, 17, 19, 2, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 35, and 3 8.
21 Case No. 4.
22 Cases Nos. 9, 1o, 16, and 29.
23 Cases Nos. 6, 14, and z5.
24 Cases Nos. I I, 2o, 21, and 30.
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dispute existed. A resort to other sources of information" re-
vealed, however, that thirteen more cases involved disputes be-
tween the immediate parties to the employment relation,"s and
eighteen more were between employer and non-employees.
Thus, by the present Ohio definition, a total of sixteen were
strictly speaking "labor disputes" and twenty-two were not.
In this connection it should be pointed out that one of these
cases, the Frankel case, presents a set of facts that, for the pur-
pose of this classification, is anomalous. Plaintiff was a member
of an auto dealers' association and had delegated it to full
authority to bargain with labor unions. The association had
previously made an agreement with defendant union and plain-
tiff had observed it, although none of its employees were mem-
bers of the union. When this agreement expired and a new one
proved impossible, defendant called a strike and began picket-
ing plaintiff along with other members of the association. The
court held that these facts revealed a trade dispute, in spite of
the fact that all differences were between plaintiff and non-
employees." This case is therefore classed as a trade dispute in
this survey, although when a tabulation is made of issues and
differences between persons in an immediate employment rela-
it is necessarily excluded.
Turning then to the fifteen cases of disputes between em-
ployers and their immediate employees, an analysis of the issues
involved shows that six concerned union recognition alone, 2'
25 To determine the issues and groups involved in many of these cases we
went directly to one of the attorneys concerned with the case and received the
pertinent information from that source; in other cases our source of informa-
tion was the pleadings of the parties.
26 Cases Nos. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 19, z6, 27, 31, 34, and 38.
27 Cases Nos. 2, 3, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, I8, 2Z, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35,
36, and 37,
28 Frairkel Chevrolet Co. v. Meerchaum, No. 478466, Case No. 14; 27
Ohio L. Abs. 425, 12 Ohio 0. 387, 3 L.R.R. 347 (1938), discussed at
length, 5 O.S.L.J. ?36, 238-240 (1939).
29 Case Nos. 13, 59, 26, 31, 34, 38. Case No. 14 is the sixteenth labor
dispute case, but is excluded for the reasons set forth in the preceding para-
graph.
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four others involved this along with other issues- as appears
from the following case to case itemization-the balance of is-
sues in dispute being well scattered. Thus, one case each in-
volved wages, hours and recognition,"0 closed shop,"' combina-
tion of wages, hours, recognition and working conditions,"
wages and recognition,3 wages and seniority rights,"4 recogni-
tion and reinstatement,"5 wages, hours, recognition and rein-
statement,3 and one involved the manner of plaintiff's conduct
of his own business.:" In this instance, the plaintiff company,
engaged in the application of felt insulation to pipes, had the
felt cut in its own plant, using its own union employees. De-
fendant, business representative of the union, called a strike of
defendant employees on the ground that the felt should not
have been cut in plaintiff's shop. Finally, the last case involved
an effort by employers engaged in the trucking business to re-
strain their employees from interfering with efforts to deliver
goods to customers through picket lines established by the em-
ployees of these customers."
An examination, on the other hand, of the twenty-three
cases involving non-employees of plaintiff reveals at once that
the most noticeable fact is the prevalence of a unionization pro-
gram as the cause of the dispute. Sixteen cases were of this
sort,"3 two involved an effort to compel plaintiff to raise his dry
cleaning prices,"0 and the balance was distributed one each
among the following issues or combinations of them: rein-
statement, 1 employment of negroes,42 wages, hours and refusal
o Case No. 25.
31 Case No. i o.
" Case No. 6.
33 Case No. i.
r Case No. 7.
s Case No. 4.
3 Case No. 8.
17 Case No. 5.
Case No. z7.
, Cases Nos. 2, 3, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, Z3, 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35,and 36.
o Cases Nos. zi and 2z.
41 Case No. 15.
4" Case No. 37.
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to bargain collectively,43 closed shop and refusal to observe
union hours,44 and failure to arrive at an agreement at the ter-
mination of a former contract."
It was stated earlier that there were four cases in which an
express finding was made that no "legitimate trade dispute"
existed.4" In all four of these, the defendants were non-em-
ployees. This accords with the conventional view that, in most
Ohio courts, in order to constitute a legitimate trade dispute
there must exist an employer-employee relationship.
An important matter within the scope of this survey is the
type of acts restrained by the various injunctions and restraining
orders. Of course, the kinds of acts that will be enjoined de-
pend upon the type of activity that the defendants are carrying
on. Thus, we cannot say that because an injunction forbids only
the use of certain publicity, intimidation and "dogging" of non-
strikers, that it necessarily follows that the same court would
not restrain the blocking of access to plaintiff's premises, or in-
terference with deliveries. It may mean only that the two
latter types of activities were not being carried on and thus the
plaintiff did not pray for their prohibition. However, we can
list the number of instances in which a particular type of activity
is enjoined and learn from such listing the kinds of conduct
which the court will not sanction when it is brought to its atten-
tipn. It will also reveal the tactics resorted to by labor to ac-
complish its purpose.
Ohio decisions have long recognized the legality of certain
behavior in the presence of a trade dispute which, in its absence,
they enjoin. Considering first the sixteen cases in which there
was either an express finding of such a dispute or in which the
facts revealed its presence, we can now proceed to itemize the
acts restrained. An almost invariable subject of injunction is,
of course, violence and intimidation. Twelve cases showed this
restraint.4 ' Insulting language was forbidden in six."
4s Case No. ii. " Case No. 14.
4 Case No. 20. 46 See note 24.
47 Cases Nos. I, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 19, 25, 26, 27, 34, and 38.
4 Cases Nos. 1, 6, 19, 25, 27, and 38. . 7
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The courts made specific mention of the use of publicity in
only five of this group of cases.4" In three of these, the injunc-
tion was aimed at particular types of publicity, i.e., the defend-
ants were enjoined from carrying banners,"° no other mode of
publicity being mentioned. In the fourth of these five cases,"1
the pickets were permitted to carry signs and the injunction
expressly told them what words their signs could contain. The
fifth case forbade the defendants from publishing any false
statement with reference to plaintiff's business, whether written
or oral; it also forbade the defendants from making any state-
ment, in writing or otherwise, to the effect that a strike was in
progress at plaintiff's place of business. 2 The use of threatening
language was forbidden in two cases,"3 and acts of trespass in
three. 4
In the matter of restraint of picketing, we find that even
though a direct employer-employee relationship existed all
picketing was enjoined in two cases." This is contrary to the
usual view in cases of trade disputes. The other cases, however,
permitted limited picketing; the number of pickets permitted
varying from two to twelve. More specifically, six cases per-
mitted two pickets," two cases allowed three pickets,57 one case
allowed four," and one allowed twelve. One case made no
reference to the number of pickets to be permitted but merely
stated that peaceful picketing might be carried on.6"
4' Cases Nos. 14, 15, 19, 31, and 34-
" Cases Nos. 15, 31, and 34.
5' Case No. 19.
52 Case No. 14.
+" Cases Nos. 27 and 38.
t Cases Nos. 4, 19, and z 5 .
o5 Cases Nos. 31 and 34.
r1 Cases Nos. 1, 4, 10, 13, and 38.
5 Cases Nos. 7 and 19.
s Case No. 25.
Case No. 8. In referring to the number of pickets permitted in each
cace we are not stating the total number of pickets that was allowed. The
figures merely indicate the number of pickets permitted at each gate or en-
trance. Of course in some cases there being only one gate or entrance the
number indicated would be the total number allowed.6
o Case No. 14.
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In one case,6 no picketing apparently was conducted so we
cannot say whether picketing would or would not have been
enjoined. One of the defendants in this case was a union official
who had called a strike against the plaintiff company for the
reason that the plaintiff company which had employed union
men had had its employees do a type of work which the de-
fendant claimed should not have been done in the plaintiff
company's shop. The defendant had also imposed a fine against
the plaintiff company for an alleged infraction of the union
rules. The court enjoined this defendant and all other officers
of the union from calling a strike at plaintiff's place, and, in
case a strike order had already been issued, enjoined the de-
fendant from aiding or continuing the strike. The defendant
was also enjoined from trying to collect the fine levied against
the plaintiff. The injunction in this case is unique in that it is
aimed not directly at the strikers themselves but rather at the
alleged instigator of it, i.e., the union official. It is the only
case found in which the officer of a union is told not to call a
strike, or if already called, is told not to continue it.
In another case the word "picketing" is not mentioned in
the injunction which reads in part as follows: " . . .de-
fendants are restrained from committing any acts of violence
on the person of any of plaintiff's employees, from using force
or duress upon any employee for purpose of influencing them
to interfere with the operations of the plaintiff in the conduct
of his business." There may have been picketing carried on but
the court omits to speak of it or use the term.62
Loitering or congregating at or near the plaintiff's premises
was enjoined in three cases; 63 obstruction of access to plaintiff's
premises in five;6 interference with deliveries in eight 62 and
"dogging" was enjoined in eight instances.66
61 Case No. 5.
62 Case No. 26.
63 Cases Nos. 7, i3, and 19.
64 Cases Nos. 4, 13, 14, I9, and 34.
62 Cases Nos. 6, 8, 14, 19, 25, 27, 31, and 34.
66 Cases Nos. I, 7, 8, 19, 25, 27, 34, and 38.
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Regarding the matter of the use of "persuasion" by the de-
fendants, we find that the courts enjoined the defendants from
persuading the employees of the plaintiff to breach their con-
tract of employment with said plaintiff in five cases. 7 In four
of these five cases" the defendants were also enjoined from per-
suading the plaintiff's employees to quit their employment.
This apparently was aimed at the employees who were not
working under any definite term contract of employment, or
those whose term provided for the giving of so many days
notice. In only one of the five"0 were the defendants expressly
restrained from persuading the plaintiff's employees to join a
labor union. And in another the defendants were restrained
from "interfering with any contractual relations between the
plaintiffs and their employees."7
In two injunctions the defendants are told that they may
"peacefully persuade." In one of these the defendants are
allowed to peacefully persuade the plaintiff's employees to join
a union,7' and in the other the defendants are told that they
may peacefully persuade the plaintiff's employees to quit their
employment. In addition they may persuade persons not to
enter the plaintiff's employ."
Finally, in all but two73 of the cases in the present group
there was a clause in the injunction forbidding the aiding or
abetting of anyone in any of the conduct enjoined.
The second category is made up of the twenty-two cases in
which no trade dispute existed. In four of these, it will be
recalled, the court expressly found no trade dispute74 and in
the balance the facts showed that there was no direct employ-
ment relation between the parties." In the absence of the pecu-
o7 Cases Nos. 1, 7, 13, 34, and 38.
68 Cases Nos. 1, 7, 34, and 38.
"'Case No. 34.
70 Case No. 33.
7' Case No. 7.
72 Case No. 25.
73 Cases Nos. 15 and 26.
74 Cases Nos. 11, 20, 2I, and 30.
75 Caes Nos. 2, 3, 9, 12, i5, 6, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35,
36, and 37.
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liar circumstances of the Frankel case,"6 it may therefore be
assumed that no trade dispute could have been found.
As might be expected, violence appears most frequently as
a subject of restraint (9 cases);" obstructing access to the prem-
ises comes next with eight cases, 8 followed by interference with
deliveries, six;"9 trespass" and loitering,8 five each; insulting
language,82 three cases each. The remaining acts enjoined ap-
pear in detail in the appendix.
In this group of cases the courts made specific reference to
the use of publicity in eight cases.8" In five of these all publicity,
whether written or oral, whether by signs or otherwise, "which
is intended to lead the public to believe that plaintiff is unfair
to organized labor"84 or that there is a trade dispute in exist-
ence,85 or that a strike is in progress" or to induce prospective
customers not to deal with the plaintiff8 are enjoined. By en-
joining this type of publicity we can by inference say that the
court is enjoining false publicity. Two cases dealt only with
publicity of a particular type. The prohibition was solely
against "parading with signs." 8 Another case forbade only the
use of placards.8" The last case in this group affirmatively states
exactly what publicity may be carried on. The pickets are per-
mitted to inform the public by handbills or signs that plaintiff
does not employ union labor, and also, states the injunction, to
ask the public not to patronize the plaintiff. "°
"8 Case No. 14, explained above. See note zS.
' Cases Nos. ii, iz, 16, 21, 23, 32, 33, 35, and 37.
78 Cases Nos. I1, 12, 16, 23, 29, 3Z, 33, and 37.
79 Cases Nos. iI, i6, 17, 18, 23, and 29.
80 Cases Nos. II, 24, 33, 35, and 37.
8' Cases Nos. II, 20, 30, 35, and 37-
82 Cases Nos. 12, ?3, and 32.
83 Cases Nos. 3, II, 16, 17, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30, and 37-
84 Cases Nos. i i, I6, 20, 22, and 24.
85 Cases Nos. 2o and 30.
88 Cases Nos. 16 and 30.
87 Cases Nos. 16 and 22.
8s Case No. 37.
89 Case No. 17.
9 Case No. z9. This, however, was in the temporary injunction. It was
followed by a permanent injunction which restrained all publicity, whether
written or oral.
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In the matter of picketing this survey disclosed that in this
group of cases, fourteen injunctions forbade picketing entirely;9
four, however, permitted limited picketing, three of them
allowing one picket each, 2 and the other, two. 3
We have one case in which there was no picketing and thus
no injunction against it.9 In this case the defendants wanted
the plaintiff's truck driver to join a truck driver's union. The
defendants were enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's
drivers when they were enroute to deliver customers' goods.
However, the defendants were specifically permitted to "peace-
fully persuade" the drivers to join the union. In another in-
junction, which made no reference to pickets or picketing, the
defendants were restrained from "congregating at the entrances
and from in any manner, by word or act diverting the natural
resort of the public to the plaintiff's place of business." The
defendants were also restrained from interfering with plaintiff's
employees when entering plaintiff's premises. Apparently there
were men at the entrances to plaintiff's premises, but whether
they were only "congregating" and not "picketing" is not clear
from the injunction. If there was limited picketing going on
the court, by omitting to enjoin it, probably intended to allow
it to continue, unless it can be said that the term "congregating"
can include limited picketing.9"
The use of "persuasion" by the defendants is restrained in
four cases.9 In two of these9" the defendants are enjoined from
persuading the plaintiff's employees to breach their contract of
employment with said plaintiff. In one of these the defendants
are also enjoined from persuading the plaintiff's employees to
quit their employment." One case forbids the defendants from
9 Cases Nos. 2, 3, II, 16, 17, 20, 2I, 22, 24, 28, 30, 33, 36, and 37.
92 Cases Nos. 12, 23, and 32.
'3 Case No. 29.
9 4 Case No. 18.
9' Case No. 3 5.
90 Cases Nos. I6, 17, 24, and 29.
07 Cases Nos. 16 and 29.
98 Case No. 29. This apparently means those employees who were not
under any definite term contract of employment but were rather employees at
will.
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persuading the plaintiff's tenants to breach their contracts of
tenure.9" The last case on this matter of persuasion permits the
defendants to use "peaceful persuasion." The injunction, in
part, reads: "Except by peaceful persuasion, . . . defendants
are enjoined from inducing plaintiff's employees to quit...1oo
Finally, sixteen injunctions forbade any aiding or abetting
in the acts or conduct forbidden in the other clauses of the
injunction."'
In view of the total of thirty-eight cases of restraint in
Cleveland, it is interesting to note the extraordinarily low record
of violations. Thus only eight orders to show cause were
granted,"0 2 in four of which was a violation found," 3 a fraction
of over ten per cent of all cases. In three of these fines were
imposed, and in two, jail sentences.0
In attempting to determine the ultimate disposition of the
thirty-eight cases, it was found that many times the docket
entries were lacking in full or complete information. However,
the cases can be broken down as follows: seventeen were dis-
missed by plaintiff without prejudice' and in two cases the
temporary restraining order was dissolved,' in six the tempo-
rary restraining order was made permanent,' while in four the
motion by defendants for a new trial was overruled;... nine
" Case No. 17. This case involved a building service employees union.
The defendants attempted to unionize janitors working in apartment houses.
1oo Case No. 24.
'01 Cases Nos. 2, 3, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33,
and 36.
102 Cases Nos. I, 7, 10, 12, 19, 31, 33, and 38. In case No. 9, an appli-
cation to show cause was filed but the citation was later dismissed.
103 Cases Nos. 12, 31, and 33. In case No. 7, one party was fined and
sentenced to jail for contempt, but his act was falsification of an affidavit and
not violation of the injunction.
104 Cases Nos. I z and 31.
110 Cases Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 37,
and 38.
10o Cases Nos. 7 and 15. The order dissolving the restraining order in
No. 15 was at the same time suspended for ten days within which to perfect
an appeal.
107 Cases Nos. 2, 9, 25, 28, 29, and 36.
108 Cases Nos. 9, 10, 29, and 3o. Two of these four cases are cases in
which the temporary restraining order had been made permanent. (Cases Nos.
9 and 29).
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cases lacked any entry after the issuance of the temporary re-
straining order.' The last docket entry in one case is the
granting of a motion by plaintiff to modify the restraining
order, ' and in another it is a statement that defendant's motion
to set aside all orders granted under the petition is denied.'
COLUMBUS
Late in the year of 1937 Miss Hedy LaMarr was scheduled
to thrill Columbus audiences in her classic performances in the
motion picture, "Ecstasy." The picture was scheduled to appear
in the local wrestling stadium for an eight days run. Non-union
operators were to be used. Piqued, because of being deprived
of a chance to participate in such a performance, the local oper-
ator's union took steps to unionize the enterprise. In response,
the employer filed a petition, supported by affidavit, seeking a
temporary injunction. On the same day, after filing of a bond
of $ Ioo, an injunction was granted restraining the union. Three
days later, while the picture was still being shown, the union
answered with a motion for dismissal on grounds that the in-
junction was granted without notice. Ten days after the grant-
ing of the injunction, and after "Ecstasy" had completed its
run, the court sustained the motion and dismissed the proceed-
ings with cost to the plaintiff." 2 And so another labor dispute
was resolved by use of the injunctive process.
It is sad but true that not all research problems in injunctive
practice present the prospects of allurement to be found in the
"Ecstasy" case, but in the interest of injunctive practice the
author of this note must proceed to more prosaic subject mat-
ter. Within the past five years there have been a total of ten
applications for injunctive relief in Columbus. Of these ten,
the employer was plaintiff in six cases," 3 in five of which relief
21" Cases Nos. 16, 24, 31, and 33.
"" Case No. 19.
"' Case No. 17.
112 Case No. 41.
"1 Cases Nos. 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, and Col. & Southern Ohio R. R. v.
The Association of Street R. R. Operators, Docket No. 15485 1.
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was granted." 4 The employee was plaintiff in three cases in no
one of which was relief granted."5 The remaining application
involved an inter-union dispute which resulted in injunctive
relief."6 Thus there has been injunctive relief in six cases and
no injunctive relief in four cases.
Of those cases in which all relief was denied, three were
filed by employee-plaintiffs17 and one was filed by an employer-
plaintiff." 8 A reasonable interpretation of the facts would seem
to indicate an active judicial discretion which tends to deny
injunctive relief and a conscious or unconscious bias in favor of
the employer. As will be shown, neither of these conclusions
filed by employee-plaintiffs"7 and one was filed by an employer-
plaintiff petitions for injunction were dismissed at hearing on
the motion of the plaintiff, indicating settlement out of court
before hearing date. The third employee-plaintiff case shows
no entry on the record after filing of petition. This failure to
proceed may have been the result of a denial of a temporary
restraining order at the date of petition but more likely indicates
a settlement out of court before the hearing date for temporary
injunction. As in the employee-plaintiff cases the single
employer-plaintiff case represents a situation where the dispute
upon which the petition was based was settled out of court
before the hearing date. Thus, these four cases indicate a ten-
dency of the parties to settle disputes out of court upon applica-
tion for injunction rather than a refusal of the judge to grant
an injunction either to employees or employer. The apparent
readiness of the parties to settle after the petition for injunction
"1 Cases Nos. 38, 40, 41, 43, and 44.
"i' Alex Zeabo v. Painter's Dist. Council No. 26. Docket No. 144639;
Ray Bitzer v. Painter's District Council No. 26. Docket No. 144640; and
Forest Sullivan v. Painters District Council No. 26. Docket No. 151307.
116 Case No. 42.
"11 Forest Sullivan v. Painter's Dist Council No. 26, Docket No. 151307;
Alex Zeabo v. Painter's Dist. Council No. 26, Docket No. 144639; Ray
Bitzer v. Painter's Dist. Council No. 26, Docket No. 144640.
11s Columbus & South. Ohio R. R. Co. v. Assoc. of Street R. R. Opera-
tors, Docket No. 154851.
SURVEY - LABOR INJUNCTIONS 307
has been filed indicates that such filing is an important "trading
stick" in a labor dispute.
Among the six instances involving injunctive relief are five
applications of employer-plaintiffs and one of inter-union in-
junction. Four of these represented temporary restraining
orders,"' granted ex parte upon the support of sustaining affi-
davits,1 2' on the same day the petition was filed. In the body
of this type of injunction, provision is made for an informal
hearing within five to ten days from the date of the petition for
the purpose of determining whether such injunction should
continue in the form of a temporary injunction until trial. 2' If
the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, does not grant an
ex parte temporary restraining order, a date is usually set for
informal hearing to determine whether a temporary injunction
should issue. If sufficient grounds are shown, a temporary
injunction, is then granted. The remaining two injunctions
were of this type."'2 These facts indicate that there is a dear
recognition in Columbus Courts of both the ex parte temporary
restraining order and the temporary restraining order accom-
panied by a hearing as preliminary forms of injunction. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that three petitions filed
asked for a "restraining order until such time as the cause
might be heard on plaintiff's application for temporary injunc-
tion and that on final hearing of the cause the defendants might
be permanently enjoined."'2 3 While there seems to be adequate
factual material to indicate that Columbus does recognize both
these forms, the entries made in the appearance docket do not
seem to distinguish between temporary restraining order and
temporary injunction.
Of the ten applications, only two resulted in permanent
119 Cases Nos. 39, 41, 42, and 44.
120 Case No. 42 seems to contain no affidavits. This is a clear exception to
the established practice.
321 Cases Nos. 39, 42, and 44.
122 Cases Nos. 40 and 43.
123 Cases Nos. 41 and 43; also Forest Sullivan v. Painter's Dist. Council
No. 26, Docket 151307.
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injunction."" Both of these arose from the same case through
the device of an intervening petition. This fact becomes more
impressive when it is seen that this case is the only case that
came to final hearing. It is submitted that these temporary
injunctions usually satisfy the plaintiff's need for injunctive
relief and represent the most important aspect of modern in-
junctive practice in this city.
Other aspects of these labor trials center around parties,
bonds, defendant's pleadings, fictitious names in petitions, pres-
ence of trade dispute, questions in dispute, and subject to matter
of injunction. Taking up these matters briefly, we find that, in
the naming of parties defendant, fictitious names such as "John
Doe" or "Richard Roe" were not used although at least three
cases claimed as parties defendant "All members of aforesaid
union whose names are unknown and are so numerous as to
make it impractical to bring them before the court.'.. Results
similar to the use of fictitious names are reached by the use of
this clause. As concerns the matter of defendant's pleading, the
parties in six cases failed to file pleadings of any nature.' In
one, a motion was filed,2 . and in three, defendants filed an-
swers.2 8 Bonds were required in all temporary injunctions with
the exception of one case which is doubtful. An average of all
bonds required was a little below $5oo.12
In all but one of the cases where relief was granted there
was an employer-employee relationship. By the Ohio law this
124 Cases Nos. 39 and 40.
125 Cases Nos. 39, 40, 43, and 44.
12' Cases Nos. 43 and 44; Cols. & South. Ohio R. R. Co. v. Assoc. of
Street R. R. Operators, Docket No. 154851; Forest Sullivan v. Painter's Dist.
Council No. 26, Docket No. 151307; Alex Zeabo v. Painter's Dist. Council
NO. 26, Docket No. 144639; Ray Bitzer v. Painter's Dist. Council No. 26,
Docket No. 14464o.
127 Case No. 41.
128 Cases Nos. 39, 40, and 42.
129 Due to the small number of injunctions involved an attempt to show
separate averages for ex parte injunction and temporary injunction would be
impractical. It is of interest to note that the only figures available for tempo-
rary injunction would indicate a bond of $iooo as compared with an average
of $400 for all ex parte bonds.
SURVEY - LABOR INJUNCTIONS 309
constitutes a trade dispute. Four of these cases involved a deter-
mined drive by the International Truckers Union to bring about
closed shop in the local trucking business. The activities of the
striking workers extended to active boycott of customers of the
hauling companies. 3' In the "Ecstasy" case there was an
attempt at unionization of all employees engaged in showing
this film."' In this case there was no employer-employee rela-
tion that would enable it to be classified as a trade dispute. Of
course the Inter-union injunction presents an entirely different
problem.132
The court does not seem to have the problem of existence
of a trade dispute in mind in these preliminary injunctions.
There seems to be no serious distinction made in injunctive
practice in Columbus based upon such a classification. In fact,
the only non-trade dispute case on record is milder in its form
of injunctive relief than in those where a trade dispute exists. 3'
Injunctive relief in trade dispute cases included such general
prohibitions as threats, violence and intimidation in a majority
of the cases.' Some picketing was allowed in all instances.
Express limitations on the number of pickets allowed were
found in only one case. 3' Interference with delivery, dogging
and secondary boycott provisions were common.'36 Since most
petitions were based upon destruction of property interest, in-
junction against persuasion to breach contract was universal.
Columbus' lone example of a non-trade dispute case ex-
pressly allowed picketing but enjoined such activities as threat-
ening the lives of employees, dogging employees back and forth
' Cases Nos. 39, 40, 43, and 44.
131 Case No. 41.
133 Case No. 42.
'r Case No. 41.
134 Injunction against threats, Cases Nos. 39, 40, 43, and 44; injunction
against violence and intimidation, Cases Nos. 39, 43, and 44.
"' Case No. 39.
'z Injunction against interference with delivery, Cases Nos. 39, 40, and
44; injunction against dogging, Cases Nos. 39, 40; injunction against sec-
ondary boycott, Cases Nos. 39, 40, 43, and 44.
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from work, interfering with contract rights, and from "unlaw-
fully" interfering with patrons. 3 '
The inter union dispute in Columbus enjoined the national
union from removing the charter of the local union. 3 The only
injunction granted a defendant employee enjoined persuasion
to breach dosed shop agreements by the employer."9
It is interesting to note the ultimate disposition of these
injunctions. Of the four temporary restraining orders two were
dismissed after settlement by the parties; 4 one was dismissed
on motion of the defendant,' 4' and one still stands on the books,
a solitary reminder of some squabble now probably forgotten
by both parties.'42 When the proceeding stops at the temporary
restraining order the probability exists that industrial peace now
prevails, either as a result of victory or compromise. The same
can not be said of the two cases which went to final injunction."4
These are now pending on appeal and still represent active labor
disputes.
DAYTON
During the period covered in this survey, six applications
for relief were filed. In five of these, no restraining orders were
granted. Three of these five were settled before trial.' This,
according to some sources of information, was an acceptance of
labor's demands. Another of the five is still pending,'45 and in
137 Case No. 41.
138 Case No. 42.
"" This was an ex parte restraining order granted the defendant employee
on a cross petition in Case No. 39. See Appendix 3, items 5.1 and 17.2.
140 Cases Nos. 4z and 44.
14 Case No. 41.
141 Case No. 43.
143 Cases Nos. 39 and 40.
"" The American Dry Ginger Ale Co. v. Int'l. Union of United Brewery
Workers of America, No. 874z5; The Liberal Market Inc. v. Painters, Dec-
orators and Glazers Union, Local No. 249, No. 73597; The Cappel Furniture
Co. v. Local No. 87, Upholstering Carpet and Linoleum Mechanics, No.
77716.
'
45 New Deal Employees Alliance v. Truck Drivers Union No. 517, of
the Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of
America, et al., No. 87536.
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the remaining one a trade dispute was found to exist, and there-
fore the court refused to issue an injunction. 4 6
The sixth case was the only one in which any restraint was
imposed by the court. 47 It is interesting to note that a judge
was brought in from outside the county. After a full hearing
on the merits, he issued a temporary injunction and fixed the
bond of plaintiff employer at $5oo. No preliminary restraining
order was issued. Defendants in this case were non-employee
members of a union seeking a dosed shop contract. In the peti-
tion they were included by true name, but fictitious defendants
were also made parties. Defendant union answered the bill, and
the court found that since no employer-employee relation ex-
isted between the parties, there was no trade dispute according
to the usual Ohio definition. Defendants were enjoined from
violence and intimidation, false publicity, defamation, all picket-
ing, attempting to compel plaintiff to run a dosed shop, and
from attempting a secondary boycott. No violations of this
injunction have been recorded. Although the injunction was
labeled as temporary, it seems to be destined to be permanent,
there having been no action taken to have it dissolved.
TOLEDO
During the five years covered by this survey there were
eight applications for restraint in connection with labor issues.
In three of these the petition was denied, - in one the court
in an oral opinion stating that a technical trade dispute existed
and that no unlawful acts were threatened. The opinion was
notably liberal inasmuch as "the union people have never
worked for this man; he had no union shop and he had no
dispute as to wages."' 48 The absence of restraint in the second
140 The Cappel Furniture Co. v. Teamsters Local, No. 88305.
'7 White-Allen Chevrolet, Inc. v. Auto Mechanics Local Union No. 314,
No. 88395. Case No. 45. Since reported in 27 Ohio L. Abs. 273 (1938)
and annotated in 5 O.S.L.J. 238 (1939).
1148 Aristo Dry Cleaners v. Cleaners, Pressers & Dyers Local No. 18326,
No. 144268.
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case is unaccounted for, 49 but in the third the court rendered,
in lieu, a declaratory judgment of the rights and duties of the
parties.' The denial of restraint was, however, reversed later
on appeal, and an injunction issued by the Court of Appeals.'
Of the five remaining cases in which restraint was granted,
the employer was the plaintiff asking for relief in two.'5 In
both, temporary injunctions were granted but only on hearing.
That is, there were no ex parte orders or injunctions. Of the
two cases in which the union was the plaintiff, an ex parte re-
straining order was granted in one."' This later ripened into
a temporary injunction with hearing. In the other a temporary
injunction was granted after hearing. 54 The remaining injunc-
tion is the only instance among all the fifty-five examined in
Ohio, when apparently a so-called company union is a party.'
Here it petitioned as plaintiff to enjoin the striking union. It
should be pointed out that this injunction and the two in which
the employer was granted relief grew out of the same dispute.
This was the famous Auto-Lite strike in which so much violence
and bloodshed was present. The Bingham Stamping and Tool
Company, a subsidiary of the Electric Auto-Lite Company, also
sought an injunction. The one granted to it was word for word
like that granted to the Auto-Lite Company. Thus in reality it
is more accurate to say that one injunction, rather than two, was
issued to the employer against the employees. The two injunc-
tions are, however, separately listed and tabulated on the chart.
In none of the cases where relief was granted was a trade
dispute directly found to exist by the Court. Although it does
not dearly appear in the records, it seems that (excluding the
inter-union dispute) a direct employment relation was present
in all these cases. In the two cases in which the employer was
'4°Koke v. Bartender's, Waiter's, and Cook's Local 2x6, et al., No.
144999.
Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Local No. 361, No. 140565.
Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local,
49 Ohio App. 303, 197 N.E. zo, i8 Ohio L. Abs. Po (935).
152 Cases Nos. 47 and 49. 1A Case No. 48.
"' Case No. 50. "' Case No. 46.
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the plaintiff the manner of conducting the strike was in issue."'
In the two cases in which the union was the plaintiff seeking
relief against the employer, the major point of difference cen-
tered around price fixing.1"7 The union sought to enforce an
agreement between it and certain dry cleaners concerning the
price to be charged by the dry cleaners for their work. In the
inter-union dispute the right of the company union members
to work was sought to be protected."'
As to the behavior of the defendant employees enjoined
where the employer was the plaintiff, the chart (See Appendix
3) is sufficiently clear with one exception, the limitations on
picketing. Picketing seems to have been entirely forbidden in
both these cases. However, in the Auto-Lite case," 9 the pre-
liminary injunction expressly excepted members of the defend-
ant union, and operated only, therefore, against certain other
enumerated individuals, namely, officers of the Mechanic's Edu-
cational Society Association and the Lucas County Unemployed
League and Unemployment Council. Later a written stipula-
tion was entered into. This permitted not over fifty pickets to
be on duty at any one time and not over twenty-five to be
assigned to any one group of entrances to the company's prem-
ises. Still later, a "Supplemental order and temporary injunc-
tion" was entered. This, unlike the first, operated against the
union, and expressly permitted twenty-five pickets at each group
of gates, and required numbering and the wearing of badges.
In only one of the five cases in which restraint was granted
was there even so much as an order to show cause why the
defendants cited should not be adjudged in contempt."' In
none was a contempt found.1"'
1" Cases Nos. 47 and 49.
117 Cases Nos. 48 and 50.
1 Case No. 46.
, Case No. 49.
o Case No. 48.
It should be pointed out, however, that the second injunction in the
Auto-Lite case (No. 49) was followed by "mass picketing and wholesale arrests,
on contempt charges, followed by rioting and virtually a siege of the plant." A
settlement was ultimately worked out and the case was dismissed without entry
of a final decree.
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In the matter of ultimate disposition of the cases, two of the
temporary injunctions were made permanent 62 and in the
remaining three no entry appears after the issuance of the
temporary injunction. None of the five was appealed5 but it
has already been pointed out that in one of the three cases where
injunctive relief was originally denied, an appeal was later taken
and the decree reversed.:'
YOUNGSTOWN
The prevalence of restraining orders sought during the
period of this survey was not excessive. There were nine appli-
cations made and four of those were denied. No permanent
injunctions were granted. In the five cases in which some
restraint was granted 64 the order was simply endorsed by the
granting judge on the petition and summons. The form of the
endorsement was "Temporary Injunction Allowed," "Tem-
porary Restraining Order Granted as Prayed For" or "Tem-
porary Injunction and Restraining Order Granted." Both the
members of the bench and the bar make no apparent distinction
between a temporary injunction and a restraining order. They
use the terms interchangeably.
In the five cases in which restraining orders were issued the
only evidence offered, as far as the court records show, was
sworn petitions. In the four cases in which the order was denied
there were hearings and a presentation of witnesses for both
sides.' ' No injunctions were granted defendants in any of the
cases.
162 Cases Nos. 48 and 50.
'
63 Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local.
49 Ohio App. 303, 197 N.E. 250, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 510, 3 Ohio 0. 2z2
(1935).
164 Cases Nos. 51 to 5 5 inclusive.
166 The following were the four cases in which no relief was granted:
Frank Gethering & John Kuhns, Officers of Meat Cutters, etc. v. Geo. Oles
(Oles Market) etc. & John Doe; Thombs Bros. Sales & Service v. Inter=a-
tional Assoc. of Machinists, No. 02,i69; Triangle Rain Coat Co. v. Chauf-
feurs, Teamsters & Amalgamated Clothing Workers, No. 97,193; Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Retail Clerks Internat. Assoc. & Amalgamated
Meatcutters & Butchers, et al., No. 102,404.
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Without exception the injunction forms were prepared by
the attorneys. The injunctions were not all granted in the court
chambers, but some were granted at the residence of the judge.
The petitioner was required to put up a bond varying from one
to two hundred dollars in each instance, the average for all five
being one hundred and sixty dollars. The parties enjoined were
referred to by a general description of the class, and by the use
of fictitious names; the union officials were specifically listed.
The issues involved in the cases wherein restraint was
granted were: In three 66 of the five there was attempted union-
ization by non-employees. In the remaining two there was
inter-union competition involved in one 67 and closed shop in
the other."' The issues in the cases where no restraint was
granted were: Wages, collective bargaining and recognition in
one; and hours, discrimination against union member, and
breach of a closed shop agreement by employer, in each of the
others respectively.
The explanation for the absence of restraint was not entirely
apparent from the court records. The issue is still pending in
one controversy, but the date for further hearing has passed and
no further entry has been made, so the case is obviously settled
as far as the parties are concerned.169 There was a trade dispute
in one instance,17' . . . "firing a man because of his union affili-
ation, . . ." which was sufficient reason for a denial of an order.
Another case was apparently settled,7 and in the fourth case
the plaintiff union was denied an injunction to restrain the
employer from breaching a closed shop agreement because the
union failed to arbitrate as per contract." 2
106 Cases Nos. 51, 53, and 54.
10137 Case No. 52. One union had here a collective bargaining contract
with the employer and another was seeking control.
18 Case No. 55.
16Ir Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Retail Clerks, etc.
170 Thombs Bros. Sales & Service v. Int'l. Assoc. of Machinists.
171 Triangle Rain Coat Co. v. Chauffeurs & Teamsters and Amalgamated
Clothing Workers.
'
7 2 Frank Gethering and John Kuhns v. George Oles (Oles Market) and
John Doe.
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Two of the restraining orders were very broad and enjoined
actions that ordinarily would be tacitly permitted. Both peti-
tions alleged a gross amount of violence which the court prob-
ably thought warranted the unusual restraint.' The behavior
enjoined in the presence of a trade dispute included in the two
cases falling in that category was: violence and intimidation,
threats, all publicity, tresspass, all picketing, public assembly,
loitering, obstructing access, interference with deliveries, dog-
ging, obeying order of union official, persuasion to breach em-
ployment contract, joining union, persuading to refrain from
seeking employment, secondary boycott, and general aiding
and abetting.
The behavior enjoined in the absence of a trade dispute in
the remaining three cases... was: violence and intimidation,
threats, interference with deliveries, persuasion to join union,
secondary boycott, publicity to customers, and striking. The rec-
ords do not reveal any violation of these injunctions in any of
the five cases.
The ultimate disposition of the cases was as follows: Two
of them were vacated by subsequent procedure before the same
court,'7  the nature of which is not apparent from the record.
Two cases are listed as still open but the disputes seem to have
been settled,7" although that is not apparent from the court
records. In the remaining case there was no indication as to its
disposition, but it too seems to have been settled.'
CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
In considering this entire group of five counties, certain
observations can be made with more or less assurance. In the
first place all inferences in terms of totals must be interpreted
1 Cases Nos. 5z and 55.
'74 Cases Nos. 51, 53, and 54.
17-1 Cases Nos. 5 x and 54.
176 Cases Nos. 52 and 53.
17 Case No. 55.
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in the light of the disproportionate number of cases from Cleve-
land. Forming, as these do, over half of all those comprised
in the survey, each total is necessarily heavily weighted by the
Cleveland cases. Thus to say that 51 out of 55 injunctions are
obtained by employers (Appendix 3, item I) would be mani-
festly inaccurate in the Toledo area where three out of five
have been employees, two against their employers, and one in
an inter-union dispute.' 8 A similar caution must be used in
most state-wide generalizations. It is a further fact that in the
last analysis, the sampling of 55 cases from five communities in
five years does not provide a broad enough statistical base for
final generalization.
Before commenting further upon the data collected, it is
of interest to note the prevailing confusion in terminology as
to "restraining orders" and "temporary injunctions." Inter-
views with lawyers practicing in the same city revealed a belief
among some that the terms are synonymous; among others that
they represent distinct forms of relief. A similar conflict in
opinion was found among the files and entries on court records.
For the purpose of this survey, therefore, it became necessary
to espouse one or the other view consistently. After an exami-
nation of the statutes it was therefore decided to use the two
terms in distinct senses, - to restrict "restraining order" to a
preliminary ex parte order issued to maintain the status quo
until such time as a hearing could be had as to the issuance of
a temporary injunction. Thus the criterion adopted is the
absence or presence of a hearing, respectively.
One of the most significant facts revealed by this survey is
the frequency of these ex parte restraining orders (See Ap-
pendix 3, items 2.1 and 3.1). In Youngstown we find this
practice present in all five cases, in Columbus in sixty per cent,
and in Cleveland in thirteen per cent, - a total of fourteen
71 Such a statement would be particularly misleading in view of the fact
that the Cleveland study was restricted to cases of employer-plaintiffs. No data
were gathered on employee-plaintiffs. See note 7 above.
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instances.' This throws light on the often advanced contention
that injunctions are rarely if ever granted in Ohio without a
hearing at which both parties are represented. The statesman-
like practice of Judge Hurd, of Cleveland, in this respect should
be a matter of special commendation,' while the unanimity of
the denial of a hearing in Youngstown should be equally con-
demned.' 8' In the matter of bonds, the average for employers
in all five cities runs just under $5oo, with Toledo running
twice that and Youngstown, where all orders -are ex parte,
requiring only $16o. The median for all 4o bonds is $5oo.
Figures for employees' bonds are too scarce to interpret, though
the few cases available show an average of over three times
and a median of twice that of the employers. This, however,
is undependable in view of the two very high bonds in Toledo.
Employees so rarely ask affirmative relief that no rule can be
stated.
It is interesting to note that regardless of whether a tech-
nical trade dispute exists or not, the question most frequently
in dispute is that of union recognition or program. For instance,
in trade dispute cases there were eleven such issues out of 26--
almost half, -and in non-trade dispute cases 21 out of 29,
- over two-thirds (Appendix 3, items 14.1 and I5.i). The
dosed shop has taken on significance in Columbus only and
wages have figured six times in Cleveland but no where else.
Another highly revealing portion of the survey shows the
extent to which peaceful behavior is being enjoined in Ohio
even in the presence of a technical trade dispute. It is custom-
arily believed, in reliance in part upon reported decisions, that
where the controversy is between employer and employees, only
'79 Thirteen of these were granted employer-plaintiffs; but in Toledo
there is one instance of an ex tarte order granted an employee-plaintiff against
an employer. (Case No. SO).
180 See the excerpt from Judge Hurd's letter quoted in note xo above.
181 It is also interesting to recall that in Youngstown there were four
instances where a hearing was granted, in all of which no injunction issued.
Thus in that city in every case of a hearing, restraint was denied; in every ex
tarte case it was granted.
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violence, intimidation, fraud, defamation and tortious behavior
generally, will be enjoined. Put in other words, it has often
been claimed that if Ohio had a labor injunction statute com-
parable to the Norris-La Guardia Act and the sixteen state
counterparts, we should only be declaring the present state of
practice, - except, of course, for the broader definition of trade
dispute contained in those statutes.
This survey meets this contention squarely. It shows 24-
instances of restraint issuing in the presence of a trade dispute
as defined in Ohio. (Appendix 3, item 17.1). In addition to
the behavior which, as indicated, would be enjoined even under
statutes, there is one case of restraint of all publicity, two of
public assembly, three of persuasion to join a union, eleven of
persuasion to breach of contract, nine to terminate it and one of
persuasion of potential employees from seeking employment.
Most surprising of all, peaceful picketing was entirely forbidden
in six cases, two each in Cleveland, Toledo and Youngstown.
The practical significance of the enactment in Ohio of a so-called
"labor injunction act" in the prevention of restraint in cases
such as these is dearly apparent.
In cases where no trade dispute existed, the survey reveals,
however, the expected pattern; violence, threats, insults, false
or defamatory publicity and trespass are restrained in accord
with accepted principles. In 15 cases all picketing is enjoined.
This is as much to be expected as is the permission of peaceful
picketing in the presence of a trade dispute. But it is out of
character to find the five instances where limited picketing is
permitted, a departure by way of liberality only exceeded by
the offsetting severity of denying all picketing in the six in-
stances previously referred to in cases where a trade dispute
existed.' 2 While the variation toward liberality is chiefly found
in Cleveland, that toward severity is distributed equally be-
tween Cleveland, Toledo and Youngstown, although on a
18 2 A recent case in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County has
permitted two persons to "patrol" with truthful signs and in the absence of
a trade dispute. The court did not regard this as "picketing." Burr Stores
Corp. v. Specter, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (i939).
LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1939
percentage basis Youngstown leads on the rest in restraint of
picketing, assembling and peaceful persuasion.
No violations of injunctions appear as of record except in
Cleveland, and there in only 4 out of the 38 cases in which
orders were issued (Appendix 3, item 18). No damages appear
to have been included in any injunction covered in the survey.
Finally, the ultimate disposition of the 55 cases appears to con-
firm the opinion expressed earlier, that injunctions in labor
controversies stand alone in the finality of their effect. Very
rarely is a case taken up to a higher court; for the most part
cases are dismissed or no entry at all appears after issuance of
the temporary injunction. Thirty-two out of the fifty-five are
accounted for in one of these ways (Appendix 3, item i9).
Labor injunction law in practice is not, then, just the same
as labor injunction law in the books. Ex parte practice is one
item; another is the degree of restraint where a technical trade
dispute in fact exists; a third the occasional variation toward
laxity in cases where one does not exist. Further discrepancies
have been pointed out; still others are shown in the chart in
Appendix 3. These divergencies this survey unquestionably
establishes. It dearly does not, however, make it possible to
project a state-wide pattern of trial court practice. Only an
extension of such a survey to many other Ohio communities can
provide the outline of the whole picture. Even now a generali-
zation is to a large degree a matter of conjecture.
But it is hoped that this survey may make a contribution
beyond the mere factual material which it contains. It is the
first effort to gather and integrate detailed data on labor injunc-
tion practice in trial courts. It proves, in fact, that such infor-
mation is collectable and that it can be integrated. In this
respect it is capable of serving, therefore, as a model for more
comprehensive efforts in the future. Already, the pattern is
taking form, and predictions are becoming feasible; but not
until the time arrives when similar projects are completed on
a much wider scale, shall we have an adequate base for the con-
struction of truly dependable conclusions.
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APPENDIX
No. I. Table of Cases.
For purpose of convenience and economy of space, the fifty-five
cases discussed in this article are grouped by cities and arranged alpha-
betically by plaintiff in each group. Docket numbers in the Common
Pleas Court of each county are also given. They are then numbered
in one series throughout and cited in the foot-note by case number only.
Cleveland-(Cuyahoga County)
I. The Astrup Co., a corporation v. The Upholsterers' Carpet &
Linoleum Mechanics' International Union of North America, Local
No. 48, et al. No. 407,044.
2. Louis Bergman, Richard Bergman, a partnership doing business as
Sol Bergman Company v. The Retail Clerks International Protec-
tive Association, et al., Local 1347, etc., et al. No. 477,202.
3. B. TV. Braushild Motors, Inc. v. B. R. Mathessen, etc., et al. No.
455,442.
4. The Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Frank Rogers, etc., et al. No.
4o6,8o6.
5. The Clark Asbestos Co. v. Albert P. Dalton. No. 4o6,344.
6. The Cleveland File Co. v. William Thoma, etc., et al. No.
410,157 •
7. The Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. George Kearns, etc., et al. No.
416,140.
8. The Cleveland Worsted Mills Co. v. Joseph R. White, etc., et al.
No. 465,155.
9. Pearl E. Crosby, Marigold Schlueter v. Frank G. Roth, etc., et al.
No. 468,495.
io. Drake Bakeries, Inc., v. D. G. Bowles, etc., et al. No. 401,197.
I I. The Edison Ohio Stores, Inc., v. James Mason, etc., et al. No.
439,953.
12. The Efficient Tool & Die Co. v. R. J. Schmidt, etc., et al. No.
407,375.
13" I. J. Fox, Inc., v. International Furworkers Union of the United
States and Canada, Local No. 86, etc., et al. No. 448,842.
14. Frankel Chevrolet Co. v. Emmet Meerschaum, etc., et al. No.
478,466.
15. The Fuller Cleaning & Dyeing Co., a corporation v. Morris
Brickner, etc., et al. No. 405,091.
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16. Good Luck Foods, Inc. v. U. G. Rich, etc., et al. No. 47 1,812.
17. The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of 4merica v. John B. McGee,
etc., et al. No. 430,546.
18. The Harvard Lumber Co., a corporation v. Truck Drivers Local
No. 4o7, etc., et al. No. 473,082.
19. Hotels Statler Co., Inc. v. Frank P. Converse, etc., et al. No.
433,403.
20. Lyon Tailoring Co., a corporation, v. Charles Milz, etc., et al.
No. 468,935.
21. Rosa Markowitz, Sam Markowitz v. Retail Dry Cleaners" Union
No. r8333, etc., el al. No. 431,777.
22. Marstan Hat Cleaners, Inc. v. William B. Beckerman, etc., et al.
No. 431,841.
23. The McKinney Tool & Manufacturing Co. v. R. J. Schmidt, etc.,
et al. No. 407,374.
24. The Mutual Benefit Lie Insurance Co. v. John B. McGee, etc.,
et al. No. 434,8 9 5.
25. Precision Castings Co., Inc. v. George W. Haas, etc., et al. No.
452,456.
26. Precision Castings, Inc. v. Richard Gallagher, etc., et al. No.
45o,620.
27. Reserve Trucking Co., Inc., et al. v. Truck Drivers Union Local
No. 407, etc., et al. No 445,125.
28. Rogers Jewelry Co. v. The Retail Clerks International Protective
4ssociaton, et al., Local No. 1347, Herman Presser. No. 477,203.
29. Russet-Euclid Corporation, et al. v. Albert P. Dalton, etc., et al.
No. 453,921.
3o . Robert E. Saltzman, etc. v. The United Retail and Employees
Local No. 112, etc., et al. No. 469,162.
31. The Savoy Realty Co. v. John E. McGee, etc., et al. No. 434,408.
32. A. P. Schraner, doing business as A. P. Schraner Co. v. R. J.
Schmidt, etc., et al. No. 407,094.
33. The D. 0. Summers Co. v. Harry H. Hart, etc., et al. No.
415,866.
34. The William Taylor Son & Co. v. Edward Murphy, etc., et al.
No. 429,244.
35. The Terminal Garage Co., Inc. v. Robert Hearns, etc., et al. No.
414,414-
36. Frank Volk, Charles Volk, doing business as Volk's Jewelers v. The
Retail Clerks International Protective Association, Local No. 1347,
et al. No. 477,204.
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37. Woodland Market House, Inc., et al. v. The Future Outlook
League, Inc. No. 475,420-
38. Yellow Cab Co. of Cleveland, Inc. v. William Underwood, etc.,
et al. No. 408,744.
Columbus (Franklin County).
39. Anderson v. Local No. 43, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters. No. 153,474-
40. Anderson intervening petition of Miller. No. 153,474.
41. Central State Amusement Co. v. Local Union No. 386 of Motion
Picture Operators. Docket No. 153,686.
42. Columbus Typographical Union No. 5 v. William Green, Pres. of
Z. F. of L. Docket No. 151,627.
43- C. D. Kenney Co. v. Local Union 43 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters. Docket No. 155,293.
44. Powell Transfer Co. v. Local Union 413 of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters. Docket No. 155,235.
Dayton (Montgomery County).
45- White-Allen Chevrolet, Inc. v. Auto Mechanics Local No. 314.
No. 88,395.
Toledo (Lucas County).
46. Auto-Lite Council Body v. Ramsey, et al. No. 139,115.
47. Bingham Stamping & Tool Co. v. United Auto Workers Federal
Labor Unions 18384 et al. No. 139,115.
48. Cleaners, Pressers & Dyers Local 35 et al. v. Nat. Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. No. 152,867.
49. Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. United Auto Workers Federal Labor
Union No. x8384, et al. No. 139,116.
50. Jacobs, Vice President of Cleaners Union Local, 18326 v. Nathan
Greenberg, as Cadillac Cleaners. No. 144,842.
Youngstown (Mahoning County).
5I. Logan Square Elec. Co. v. International Bro. of Elec. Workers.
No. 98,118.
52. Moyer Mfg. Co. v. United Garment Workers. No. 98,594.
53. Newton Elec. Co. v. International Bro. of Electric Workers. No.
98,597•
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54. Sherman (Scrap Yard) v. International Bro. of Chauffeurs &
Teamsters. No. 99,439-
55. Smith Dairy Co. v. International Bro. of Chauffeurs & Team-
sters. No. 94,546.
No. 2. Labor Injunction Cases Officially Reported.
Cleveland (Cuyahoga County)
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bowles, 31 N.P. (N.S.) 425 (I934).
Frankel Chevrolet Co. v. Meerschaum, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 425, 12
Ohio 0. 387 (938).
Fuller Cleaning Co. v. Brickner, 32 N.P. (N.S.) 177 (1934).
Markowitz v. Retail Dry Cleaners Union, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 445;
3 Ohio 0. 366 (C.P.) (i935).
Salzman v. United Retail Employees Local 112, 25 Ohio L. Abs.
354, io Ohio 0. 6 (1938).
Savoy Realty Co. v. McGee, 3 Ohio Op. 88 (C.P.) (935)-
Dayton (Montgomery County)
White-Allen Chevrolet Inv. v. Auto Mechanics Local Union No.
314, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 273, 12 Ohio 0. 288 (1938).
Toledo (Lucas County)
Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 49 Ohio App. 303,
i8 Ohio L. Abs. 510, 3 Ohio 0. 212, 197 N.E. 250 (i935).
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No. 3. Chart Analysis of Labor Injunction Practice in Trial Courts.
Cases filed or decided between July I, 1933 and June 30, 1938.
Dash mark (-) indicates absence of data.
~~0
~i 0 0 0
Q E-) ; E
INTRODUCTORY.
Total in which some restraint granted ....
Plaintiff employer .................
Plaintiff employee ..................
Inter-union dispute .................
ANALYSIS OF CASES IN WHICH SOME
Rre.=sT NT GRANTED.
Plaintiff employer: Varieties of restraint
granted to employer against employees and
unions. Total cases ..................
Ex pare order or injunction ..........
Temporary injunction with hearing ....
Permanent injunction with hearing ....
Both temporary and permanent injunction
Plaintiff employees: Varieties of restraint
granted to employees against employer. To-
tal cases ............................
Ex pare order or injunction ..........
Temporary injunction with hearing ....
Permanent injunction with hearing ....
Both temporary and permanent injunction
Plaintiff employees: Restraint against other
employees. (Inter-Union disputes) .......
Ex pane order or injunction ..........
Temporary injunction with hearing ....
Defendant employees: Restraint granted in
cross action. Total cases ...............
Ex pare ..........................
Temporary injunction ...............
Bond of plaintiff employer: Total bonds
of all kinds ..........................
Ex parte restraint. Total cases in which
required ..........................
Average ........................
M edian ........................
No bond required .................
Temporary injunction with hearing
Total cases in which required .........
Average ........................
No bond required .................
Permanent injunction. Total cases re-
quired ............................
No bond required ...................
I 1 2
I000 Soo 1000
I 0 0
J.
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7- Bond of plaintiff employee
Total cases where bond required ......... 0 0 0 0 1
.1 Ex parte restraint ............. I .... 0 0
No bond required ................. 1
.2 Temporary injunction with hearing .... 5000
No bond required ................. I. .
8. Bond of plaintiff employees-inter-union
cases ............................... I 0 I 0 2
.1 Ex parle restraint ................... 100 0 -
No bond required ................. 0 0 -
.2 Temporary injunction ................ 0 1000 -
9. Bond of defendant employer ...........- 0 0 0 0 0
so. Bond of defendant employee in cross action - 1 0 0 0 
.1 Ex parse .......................... 1000 0 0 0 -
11. All bonds by economic group
.1 For employers. Total cases ........... 28 4 I 2 5 40
Average amount ................. 421 55o 5oo 0ooo0 6o 497
Median ........................ -......... .5o
.z For employees. Total cases ............ 0 2 0 2 0 4
Average amount .................. 0 550 0 3000 0 1775
Median ........................ -.. oo.. .. .. .1000
12. Parties
.1 Direct employment relation ........... i5 4 0 4 2 25
.2 Employer and non-employees ......... 5 0 o 0 o 7
.3 No direct employment relation apparent z8 1 0 0 2 21
•4 Inter-union dispute ................. - 1 0 1 0 2
.5 Fictitious names used ................ 21 0 1 0 0 22
13. Trade dispute, existence by Ohio Law
.s Total cases of trade dispute ............ x6 4 0 4 2 26
Direct employment relation found by court 3 0 0 0 0 3
No finding, but employment relation
present ........................... 13 4 0 4 2 23
.2 Total cases where no trade dispute ....... 2Z 2 1 1 3 29
Found by court to be absent ........... 4 0 1 0 0 5
No direct relation apparent, assumed
absent .......................... 18 1 0 0 3 22
Inter-union dispute .................- 1 0 I 0 2
QuESrIoNs n; DisPUTEr.
14. Issues where direct employment relation
involved. Total cases ................. 5 4 0 4 z 25
. Union recognition ................... 10 0 0 1 11
.2 W ages ........................... 5 0 0 0 5
.3 Hours ............................ 2 0 0 0 2
.4 Closed union shop ........ a ......... . 4 0 x 6
.5 Working conditions ................. 1 0 0 0 
.6 Seniority rights ..................... 1 0 0 0 
.7 Reinstatement ..................... 2 0 0 0 2
.8 Price fixing ........................ 0 0 z 0 z
.9 Manner of conducting business .......... 0 0 1 2
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.10 Inter-union competition .............. 0 0 0 2 0 2
.11 Manner of conducting strikes ......... 0 4 2 0 6
IS. Issues where no direct employment relation
present between parties, total cases ....... 23 1 I 0 3 z8
.I Unionization program ............... x6 1 1 3 21
.Z Refusal to bargain ................... 2 1 0 0 3
.3 Price fixing ........................ 2 0 0 0 2
.4 W ages ........................... 1 0 0 0 1
. Hours ............................ 2 0 0 0 2
.6 Employment of negroes ................ 0 0 0 1
.7 Reinstatement ..................... 1 0 0 0 1
.8 Closed shop ........................ 1. o o o 1
x6. Issues in Inter-union dispute ..............- 1 0 1 0 2
Revokation of charter ................ . 0 0 0 
Right to work, company union ........ o 0 1 0 1
BEHAVIOR RESTRAINED.
17. Defendant employees.
.s (a) In presence of trade dispute-
Instances ..................... 16 4 0 2 2 24
Violence and intimidation ...... 12 3 2 2 19
Threats .................... 2 4 2 2 I0
Insulting language ............ 6 0 2 0 8
Publicity: all restrained ........ 0 0 0 I
Falsity restrained ........... 1 0 0 0 1
Detailed specifications ........ 4 0 0 0 4
Trespass .................... 3 2 0 s 6
Picketing: entirely forbidden,., 2 0 2 2 6
Some picketing permitted ..... 10 4 0 0 14
Number of pickets: I picket o o 0 0
2 pickets.. 6 0 0 0 6
3 pickets.. z o 0 0 2
4 pickets. . I 0 0 2
12 pickets. . 0 0 0 I
25 pickets.. 0 0 2 0 2
Public assembly ............... 0 0 0 2 2
Loitering ................... 3 0 2 1 6
Obstructing access ............. .. 0 2 2 9
Interference with deliveries ..... 8 3 0 2 13
Calling or continuing strike .... 1 0 0 0 1
Collecting fine from plaintiff .... 1 0 0 0 1
Dogging ................... 8 . 0 2 12
Obeying order of union official. o 0 0 1
Persuasion enjoined: some ..... 5 4 0 1 1o
To break employment contract. 5 4 0 2 11
To terminate " " 4 3 0 2 9
To join union ............... I 1 0 1 3
To refrain from seeking em-
ployment ............... 0 0 0 I
Persuasion expressly permitted.. z 0 0 0 2
To terminate employment .... 1 0 0 0 1
To join union .............. 1 0 0 0 I
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To refrain from seeking em-
ployment ................. 1 o 0 o 0 1
Secondary boycott ............. 0 4 0 1 5
General aiding and abetting .... 14 0 2 1 17
.z (b) In presence of trade dispute-
Defendant employer. Total cases.a - 2 0 3
Price fixing by employer ....... 0 2 0 2
Persuasion enjoined ...........
To breach closed shop contract a 0 0 1
• 5 (c) In absence of trade dispute-
Defendant non-employees ........ z2 I 0 3 27
Violence and intimidation ...... 9 0 I 2 12
Threats ..................... 2 1 0 1 5
Insulting language ............ 3 0 0 0 3
Publicity: all restrained ......... 0 0 0 0 0
Falsity restrained .......... 5 0 1 0 6
Defamation restrained ....... o o 1 0
Particular form restrained .... 2 0 0 0 2
Expressly permitted ......... 1 0 0 0 1
Trespass .................... 5 0 0 0 5
Picketing: entirely forbidden ... 4 o a 0 is
Some permitted ............. 4 a 0 0 5
Number of pickets: - 3 0 0 0 3
7 pickets. . 0 0 0 1
Loitering .................... 5 0 0 0 5
Obstructing access ............. 8 o o o 8
Interference with deliveries ..... 6 0 0 5 7
Dogging ................... 0 0 0 I
Persuasion enjoined; total cases. 3 1 5 0 5
To breach contract .......... . 2 0 0 3
To terminate employment ..... 1 0 0 0 I
To join union .............. . 0 0 0 s s
To compel employer to require
closed shop ................ 0 0 0 1
Persuasion expressly permitted ... 0 0 0 1
Secondary boycotts ........... 0 1 0 2
General aiding and abetting .... 16 0 0 0 16
.4 (d) Inter-union disputes ...............- 1 0 5 0 2
Revocation of charter ......... 1 0 1
Violence and intimidation ...... 0 5
Interference with union affairs. . 1 0
Insulting language ............ o 1 1
Publicity, defamatory .......... 0 1
Threats ..................... 0 1 1
Picketing: entirely forbidden... o 0
25 pickets permitted ......... 0 1
Loitering .................... . 0 1
Obstructing access .............. o 0 1
Interfering with deliveries ...... 0 1
Molesting or annoying ......... 0 5 1
Claiming to represent plaintiff in
bargaining .................. 0 1 a
Ordering non-members of defend-
ant union to cease work ........
General aiding and abetting .....
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1S. Violations of orders or injunctions
.1 Orders to show cause granted ......... 8 0 0 I 0 9
.2 Total violations .................... 4 0 0 0 0 4
.3 Fines for contempt .................. 3 0 0 0 0 3
4 jail sentence ....................... z 0 0 0 0 2
19. Ultimate disposition ................... 38 6 1 5 5 5
.1 Dismissed ......................... 17 3 0 0 0 2o
.2 Temporary injunctions dissolved ....... . 2 0 0 0 3
.3 No entry after issuance of temporary
injunction ........................ 4 1 1 3 3 5z
.4 Temporary injunction made permanent. 6 2 0 2 2 12
. Motion by defendants for new trial
overruled ................ 4 0 0 0 0 4
.6 Appealed to upper court .............. .- 2 0 1 0 3
